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Book	review:	The	Left	Case	for	Brexit:	Reflections	on
the	Current	Crisis
In	large	part,	the	British	and	European	left	has	remained	trapped	within	the	narrow	horizons	of	the	nation-state.
Instead	of	counterproductively	supporting	Brexit,	it	would	do	better	to	join	forces	and	push	for	change	within	the	EU,
writes,	Peter	J.	Verovšek,	in	his	review	of	The	Left	Case	for	Brexit:	Reflections	on	the	Current	Crisis.
Although support for illiberalism and nationalism, as well as scepticism of cosmopolitanism and globalisation more
generally, have been on the rise for some time, these trends broke out into the open in 2016, as the result of two
events: the narrow victory of the Leave campaign in the United Kingdom’s 23 June referendum on its membership
in the European Union (EU) and Trump’s election as President of the United States on 8 November. As
fundamental threats to the post-Cold War political and economic order, these developments reverberated far
beyond the Anglo-Saxon world. For most political observers, the victories of President Trump and his English ally
Boris Johnson, the leader of the Leave campaign who became Prime Minister in July of 2019, seemingly signalled
the political breakthrough of a powerful new form of far-right populism opposed to free trade and the progressive
value changes brought about by globalisation.
These	developments	have	pushed	progressives	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	to	consider	how	these	short-term
defeats	might	be	turned	into	long-term	victories.	In	the	US,	thinkers	like	Nancy	Fraser	reflected	on	how	Trump’s
election	might	create	opportunities	for	the	left	to	build	a	‘counter-hegemonic	bloc	that	could	resolve	the	crisis’	by
increasing	the	contradictions	of	contemporary	neoliberal	capitalism	and	by	pushing	the	left	back	to	its	roots	in	the
concerns	of	the	working	classes.	In	his	new	book,	The	Left	Case	for	Brexit,	the	Harvard-based	British	historian	of
political	thought	Richard	Tuck	goes	even	further.	Rather	than	merely	finding	a	silver	lining	in	the	referendum	vote,
he	instead	presents	a	full-throated	defense	of	‘lexit’	–	i.e.,	Brexit	for	the	left	–	that	treats	leaving	the	EU	as	the
opportunity	that	democractic	socialism	has	been	waiting	for	since	its	heyday	in	the	years	immediately	following
World	War	II.	By	reinvigorating	the	sovereign	powers	of	Parliament	in	Westminster,	Tuck	concludes	that	Brexit	is
desirable	per	se,	as	it	will	once	again	make	socialist	policies	based	on	nationalisation	possible	in	the	UK:	‘The	great
prize	awaiting	the	Left	in	Britain…is	genuine	Brexit	followed	by	a	Labour	government’	(55).
In	addressing	contemporary	events	in	real-time,	Tuck’s	book	is	an	intervention	in	political	debates	within	the	British
public	sphere,	not	a	research	monograph.	The	volume	is	composed	of	a	series	of	dated	entries,	which	Tuck
originally	published	in	various	online	outlets,	including	Dissent	Magazine,	The	Full	Brexit,	Briefings	for	Brexit,	and
this	blog.	As	a	result	of	their	chronological	organisation,	starting	before	the	referendum	vote	on	16	April	2016,	and
running	through	31	October	2019,	as	well	as	its	lack	of	extensive	references,	the	book	reads	more	like	an	epistolary
novel	than	an	academic	text.	This	collection	of	Tuck’s	writings	is	well-paced,	incisive,	and	at	times	surprisingly
compelling,	even	to	those	like	me,	who	are	strident	opponents	of	Brexit	from	the	left.
Tuck’s	central	argument	builds	on	his	reading	of	the	British	constitution	and	the	possibilities	it	offers	for	socialists	to
achieve	their	goals	democratically,	i.e.	by	majority	vote.	The	singular	feature	of	the	UK’s	Parliament	is	that	it	does
not	differentiate	between	constitutional	law	and	regular	legislative	practice.	This	means	not	only	that	any	law
passed	by	one	sitting	of	Parliament	can	be	undone	by	a	majority	vote	in	the	next;	it	also	grounds	‘the	well-known
“omnicompetence”	of	Parliament’	(106),	which	allows	it	to	adopt	any	bill	it	chooses,	without	regard	for	protected
rights	and	pre-existing	constitutional	constraints.
While	the	powers	of	Parliament	would,	in	theory,	allow	it	to	make	staying	in	bed	after	8	o’clock	a	capital	offence,	as
John	Selden	argued	in	the	seventeenth	century,	it	also	means	that	Parliament	can	engage	in	the	nationalisation	of
private	property	by	expropriation	(i.e.,	without	compensation),	by	simple	majority	vote.	This	fact	grounds	both	Karl
Marx’s	argument	that	in	England	‘the	workers	can	attain	their	goal	by	peaceful	means’	because	there	merely	need
to	take	over	Parliament,	and	Tuck’s	opposition	to	the	EU,	international	free	trade	agreements	and	constitutions	with
judicial	review,	all	of	which	protect	property	and	other	liberal	rights	in	ways	that	legislatures	cannot	easily	overturn.
Ultimately,	Tuck’s	left	case	for	Brexit	is	based	on	the	need	to	restore	Parliament’s	full	sovereign	powers	by
releasing	it	from	the	quasi-constitutional	restrictions	of	the	EU,	which	serves	as	a	fetter	on	the	‘highly	unconstrained
democratic	politics’	(71)	necessary	for	the	peaceful	attainment	of	socialism.
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The	Left	Case	for	Brexit:	Reflections	on	the
Current	Crisis.	By	Richard	Tuck.	Polity,
Cambridge,	UK/Medford,	MA,	2020,
viii+175pp.,	ISBN:	978-1-5095-4228-4
Overall	this	is	a	very	English	book.	It	is	a	master	class	in	British	constitutionalism	and	the	history	of	the	British
Labour	Party.	Tuck	presents	many	interesting	historical	lessons	and	provides	a	bracing	argument	against	the
neoliberal	policy	preferences	enforced	by	the	EU’s	functional	constitution,	with	its	emphasis	on	market	freedoms
and	its	enforcement	of	a	level	economic	playing	field,	which	prevents	the	adoption	of	policies	of	state	aid.	However,
despite	its	strengths,	the	book’s	Englishness	is	also	a	drawback	at	many	points,	as	Tuck’s	perspective	on	the	EU
and	the	continent	more	generally	are	often	parochial,	if	not	downright	condescending.
Democracy	beyond	Westminster
At	first	glance,	much	of	Tuck’s	argument	appears	to	be	based
on	the	fact	that	the	EU’s	‘constitutional	order	pushes
consistently	in	what	we	might	call	a	neoliberal	direction’	(49).
However,	he	later	notes	that	he	would	support	Brexit	‘[e]ven	if
the	structures	of	the	EU	at	the	moment	were	entirely	friendly	to
radical	socialist	measures’	(71).	Once	we	dig	deeper,	it	thus
becomes	clear	that	Tuck’s	argument	is	not	based	on	the
supposed	market	fundamentalism	of	the	EU,	but	on	the	fact
that	European	integration	creates	a	constitutional	order	that
protects	basic	rights.	Building	on	the	English	parliamentary
tradition,	Tuck	argues	that	the	‘worst	of	all	worlds	is	to	have	a
strong	constitutional	order	and	an	independent	judiciary’	(50).
The	key	point	to	recognize	here	is	that	while	Tuck	initially
frames	The	Left	Case	for	Brexit	as	an	indictment	of	the	EU,	it	is
actually	an	argument	against	the	constitutional	state
(Rechtsstaat),	which	forms	the	basis	for	most	political
communities	on	the	European	continent,	as	well	as	worldwide.
Tuck’s	discussions	of	the	unique	possibilities	offered	by	the
omnicompetent	parliament	in	Westminster	often	implicitly	(and
occasionally	even	explicitly)	imply	that	democratic	control	and
socialist	policies	are	not	only	impossible	in	the	EU,	but	also	in
any	state	that	protects	rights	constitutionally	and	allows	for
judicial	review.	On	Tuck’s	interpretation,	such	constitutional
systems	at	both	the	international	and	the	domestic	level	are
‘designed	to	obstruct’	(20)	democratic	politics	by	ensuring	that
no	state	or	‘Act	of	the	UK	Parliament	by	itself	can	amend	them’
(45).	The	key	implications	–	which	are	never	explicitly	spelt	out
but	are	clear	nonetheless	–	are	that:	(a)	constitutional	states
are	not	(and	cannot	ever	be)	democracies,	and;	(b)	that	the	UK
is	currently	the	only	state	in	Europe	with	the	potential	to	be	a
democracy	(a	latent	possibility	that	it	will	only	be	fulfilled	after	a
hard	Brexit	and	the	end	of	the	transition	period,	when	EU	treaties	cease	to	apply	and	the	European	Court	of	Justice
loses	jurisdiction	over	the	UK).
At	an	academic	level,	this	argument	is	intriguing.	However,	it	is	underdeveloped.	It	is	also	vastly	overstated	and
presents	several	practical	problems	in	light	of	Tuck’s	stated	desire	to	achieve	socialism	through	the	ballot	box.
Given	the	constraints	of	space	in	this	already	too	long	review,	I	shall	name	just	a	few.
First	past	the	post
To	start,	Tuck	makes	this	argument	about	the	more	democratic	nature	of	Parliament	even	though	continental
legislatures,	which	are	elected	based	on	systems	of	proportional	representation,	do	a	much	better	job	of	translating
votes	into	seats	than	the	UK’s	‘first	past	the	post’,	single-member	districts.	The	UK’s	electoral	system	routinely
‘wastes’	the	votes	of	around	70%	of	the	electorate,	who	either	provide	excess	votes	for	candidates	already	elected
or	submit	ballots	for	candidates	that	lose	and	thus	have	no	impact	on	the	final	makeup	of	Parliament.	Much	like	in
the	US,	this	electoral	system	also	suppresses	minority	political	viewpoints	and	decreases	the	range	of	political
positions	that	are	institutionally	represented	by	ensuring	that	only	two	parties	can	realistically	win	the	majority	of
seats	in	the	legislature
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Even	taking	the	fact	that	Parliament	provides	a	stunningly	bad	representation	of	the	political	desires	of	the
electorate,	its	greater	theoretical	potential	for	socialism	–	upon	which	much	of	Tuck’s	argument	rests	–	does	not
seem	to	be	borne	out	in	practice.	Data	collected	by	the	OECD	shows	that	most	of	the	constitutional	states	in
Europe	–	even	those	that	are	much	poorer	than	the	UK	–	have	much	more	developed	systems	of	social	welfare
protection	than	the	UK.	Additionally,	many	of	these	states	have	maintained	the	kinds	of	socialist	policies	Tuck
supports,	including	free	university	tuition	and	public	control	over	the	rail	and	other	transport	infrastructure,	while
remaining	members	of	the	EU.	Far	from	standing	in	the	way	of	the	brand	of	socialism	expressed	by	Labour’s
‘radical’	2019	manifesto,	which	Tuck	argues	‘would	be	very	hard	to	implement	within	the	EU	as	currently	configured’
(39),	these	new	spending	commitments	–	had	they	been	realised	after	a	Labour	victory	–	would	barely	have	brought
the	UK	into	line	with	leading	member-states	of	the	EU,	such	as	France	and	Germany.	It	is,	therefore,	hard	to	blame
the	Labour	Party’s	difficulties	in	implementing	socialist	policies	in	the	UK	on	the	EU.
Finally,	Tuck	endorses	Parliament’s	omnicompetence	by	arguing	that	it	provides	an	outlet	for	popular	discontent,
thus	‘immediately	remov[ing]	the	emotional	force	from	the	radical	Right’s	message’.	As	a	result,	he	notes	that	he
expects	Brexit	to	lead	‘the	complete	implosion	of	UKIP’	(39)	and	the	radical	right	more	generally.	Nigel	Farage’s
quasi-fascist	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	has	indeed	lost	much	of	its	support	since	the	passage	of	the
referendum.	However,	this	does	not	appear	to	be	because	the	xenophobic	nationalism	it	represents	has	been
robbed	of	its	emotional	force,	as	Tuck	anticipates.	On	the	contrary,	with	the	ascension	of	Boris	Johnson,	it	appears
that	UKIP	has	taken	over	the	previously	centre-right	Conversatives	from	within,	pushing	the	Tory	Party	toward	the
populist,	authoritarian	right	at	a	time	when	they	are	sole	control	of	Parliament	and	all	its	powers.
British	civil	liberties
In	addition	to	providing	an	overly	optimistic	interpretation	of	the	present,	Tuck	also	credits	the	UK’s	constitutional
order	for	inoculating	it	against	authoritarianism.	Looking	at	current	global	trends,	as	well	as	the	history	of	twentieth-
century	Europe,	Tuck	contends,	‘As	in	the	1930s,	Britain	may	have	dodged	the	bullet	of	a	kind	of	fascism…largely
because	its	political	structures	once	again	permit	rather	than	constrain	radical	politics’	(39,	emphasis	in	original).	At
first	glance,	there	is	something	to	this,	as	it	is	true	that	the	UK	did	not	experience	totalitarianism	or	authoritarianism
of	the	type	seen	in	Germany	and	Spain	respectively	over	the	curse	of	the	past	century.
However,	while	it	has	historically	done	a	decent	job	of	respecting	the	civil	and	political	liberties	of	its	citizens	in
England,	the	UK	maintained	quasi-authoritarian	regimes	in	the	colonies	for	hundreds	of	years.	Its	treatment	of	its
non-white,	non-English	subjects	overseas	was	particularly	deplorable,	leading	to	many	atrocities	in	the	twentieth
century	alone.	Given	that	colonialism	and	imperialism	served	as	models	for	totalitarianism	–	as	Hannah	Arendt
famously	argued	–	it	is	only	possible	to	claim	that	Britain	‘dodged	this	bullet’	if	one	ignores	Parliament’s	treatment	of
its	colonial	populations	outside	England.	This	is	quite	an	oversight,	given	that	the	subjects	of	the	colonies	greatly
outnumbered	those	in	England,	and	that	much	of	the	UK’s	economic	growth	through	the	middle	of	the	twentieth
century	depended	on	the	exploitation	of	its	overseas	peoples	and	territories.
Although	Tuck	accuses	the	EU	of	being	designed	to	offer	the	possibility	of	‘imperial	nostalgia	and	direct	rule’	(144-
5),	this	claim	is	not	particularly	plausible.	The	history	of	twentieth-century	Europe	shows	that	the	EU	was	created	in
response	to	the	repression	of	minorities	and	other	subaltern	groups	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,
culminating	in	the	Holocaust.	In	light	of	these	events,	the	postwar	continental	order	was	specifically	designed	to
protect	the	basic	rights	of	the	‘juridical	person’	at	both	the	national	and	supranational	levels.
These	historical	experiences	taught	western	Europeans	that	democracy	is	not	about	more	than	just	elections	and
majoritarian	rule;	it	is	also	about	preserving	the	plurality	of	opinions	and	the	respect	for	individual	and	group	rights
necessary	to	make	elections	and	majoritarian	decision-making	meaningful.	In	this	sense,	the	protection	of	civil	and
human	rights	is	‘co-original’	with	political	rights	to	suffrage.	Seen	from	this	perspective,	the	constitutional	protection
of	basic	liberties	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	democracy,	not	a	constraint	upon	it.
The	dangers	of	English	nationalism
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In	focusing	his	discussion	almost	exclusively	on	constitutional	essentials,	and	the	supposed	neo-liberal	bias	baked
into	the	EU,	Tuck	addresses	only	one	of	the	malign	influences	that	has	been	stalking	Europe	and	the	UK	since	the
end	of	the	Cold	War	while	ignoring	the	second:	xenophobic	nationalism.	Tuck	repeatedly	expresses	his	surprise	at
the	fact	that	the	Brexit	referendum	was	pushed	for	by	powerful	elements	within	the	Conservative	Party,	given	that
EU	membership	supposedly	locks	in	the	policies	preferences	of	free-market	Tories	at	a	quasi-constitutional	level.
However,	this	interpretation	merely	signals	his	blindness	to	the	role	that	English	nationalism	plays	in	the	Brexit
project.
Although	Tuck’s	arguments	for	a	left-wing	Brexit	are	plausible	at	a	theoretical	level,	very	few	Leave	supporters
voted	for	Brexit	because	it	would	re-empower	Parliament	to	implement	socialist	policies	or	for	economic	reasons
more	generally.	Instead,	polling	data	shows	the	desire	to	‘take	back	control’	was	driven	by	cultural	factors
associated	with	opposition	to	high	levels	of	immigration	and	concerns	about	the	erosion	of	national	–	primarily
English	–	identity.
While	Tuck	remains	silent	on	the	issue	of	English	nationalism,	he	frequently	discusses	its	Scottish	variant.	Unlike
other	analysts,	who	fear	that	Brexit	will	tear	the	UK	apart,	Tuck	repeatedly	notes	that	he	expects	Brexit	to	‘stall	the
movement	toward	independence’	(38)	and	to	put	an	end	to	the	dominance	of	the	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP),
because	‘the	costs	of	disunion	for	the	Scots	would	escalate	dramatically,	both	economically	and	psychically’	(37),
after	the	UK	has	left	the	EU.	Keeping	the	Scots	in	the	Union	is	important	to	Tuck	because	the	Labour	Party	needs
the	support	of	large	numbers	of	the	generally	more	progressive,	social-democratic	voters	of	Scotland	if	it	is	ever	to
return	to	power.	Since	‘England	has	been	a	Tory	country	since	the	seventeenth	century	and	shows	no	signs	of
becoming	less	so’	(21),	the	‘prospect	of	a	left-wing	party	re-establishing	itself	in	England	depends	on	a	continuation
of	the	Union’	(37)	with	Scotland.
There	is	a	certain	logic	to	this	argument.	However,	using	Brexit	to	lock	the	Scots	into	the	UK	after	they	backed
Remain	by	a	huge	majority	is	highly	problematic.	In	particular,	it	raises	important	issues	of	democratic	legitimacy,
given	that	Scottish	voters	voted	to	remain	in	the	Union	with	England	in	their	2014	referendum	on	the	understanding
that	the	UK	would	also	remain	in	the	EU.	As	Tuck	points	out,	‘the	very	action	of	giving	Scotland	the	referendum
actually	gave	the	country	its	independence	at	the	fundamental	constitutional	level,	since	the	Scottish	people	could
now	decide	the	basic	terms	of	their	common	life’	(110).	Insofar	as	this	is	true,	then	the	2016	referendum	should	also
have	recognized	the	Scottish	right	to	national	self-determination	by	requiring	a	majority	vote	within	each	of	the	four
nations	of	the	UK	for	the	referendum	to	pass.
Instead,	Brexit	passed	based	on	a	simple	majority	vote,	which	Leave	won	only	because	of	the	vast	numerical
superiority	of	England,	whose	population	was	much	more	supportive	of	leaving	the	EU	than	any	of	the	other	nations
(the	Welsh	voted	for	Brexit	by	a	somewhat	narrower	margin,	while	the	Scots	and	Northern	Irish	both	convincingly
backed	Remain).	Despite	the	policy	and	economic	hurdles	leaving	the	EU	raises	for	Scottish	independence,	in
contrast	to	Tuck’s	expectations,	opinion	polls	in	Scotland	have	shown	a	marked	rise	in	support	both	for
independence	and	for	the	SNP	since	2016.	This	is	likely	since	the	Scots	are	well	aware	that	English	MPs	will
always	be	able	to	outvote	Scottish	MPs	in	Parliament,	just	as	the	English	population	did	in	the	2016	referendum.	It
is,	therefore,	understandable	that	the	Scots,	as	a	people	whose	independence	has	been	recognised	‘at	the
fundamental	constitutional	level’	(110),	feel	that	this	situation	violates	their	democratic	right	to	self-determination.
In	light	of	all	this,	using	the	deeply	flawed	referendum	to	raise	the	costs	of	Scottish	independence,	thus	locking
them	into	the	UK	and	out	of	the	EU,	reflects	precisely	the	type	of	attempt	to	force	‘union	upon	unwilling	populations’
(3)	of	which	Tuck	accuses	the	EU.	From	a	practical	perspective,	it	is	also	more	likely	to	increase	resentment	and
support	for	Scottish	nationalism	than	it	is	to	lead	to	support	for	British	parties,	including	Labour.	Indeed,	this	seems
to	be	the	case,	as	the	SNP	is	poised	to	win	enough	seats	to	govern	on	its	own	in	Holyrood	in	the	next	electoral
cycle,	which	is	also	the	first	since	the	UK	officially	left	the	EU.
Combatting	powerlessness
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Ignoring	the	ways	that	English	nationalism	shaped	Brexit	–	and	the	effects	that	it	has	had	on	social	life	in	the	UK
since	2016	–	is	very	dangerous.	For	example,	since	moving	to	the	UK	in	2017,	I	have	been	shocked	by	the	number
of	times	I	have	been	accosted	for	speaking	Slovenian	in	public	and	told	to	‘Go	home	to	Poland!’	by	individuals	who
assume	that	anyone	speaking	a	Slavic	language	in	the	UK	must	be	Polish.	While	my	personal	experiences	are
anecdotal,	they	are	backed	up	by	research	on	how	Brexit	has	created	a	safe	space	for	xenophobia	and	intolerance,
as	well	as	by	official	data	showing	a	rise	in	hate	crimes	directed	against	immigrants,	particularly	from	Central	and
Eastern	Europe,	since	2016.
Although	there	is	much	evidence	for	the	fact	that	Brexit	is	a	right-wing	project	driven	by	English	nationalism,	Tuck
may	also	be	correct	in	arguing	that	it	is	also	a	symptom	of	the	powerlessness	that	so	many	citizens	feel	–	‘and	it
need	be	no	more	than	that	[i.e.	a	feeling]’	(39)	–	in	the	face	of	global	economic	forces	over	which	they	have	no
control.	He	believes	that	Brexit	will	help	alleviate	this	feeling	and	will	re-empower	the	democratic	state,	which	is	‘the
one	institution	which	it	[the	left]	has,	historically,	been	able	to	use	effectively’	(16).
There	are	several	problems	with	the	argument.	As	I	have	already	pointed	out,	the	nationalist	undertones	of	Brexit
are	more	likely	to	lead	to	the	breakdown	of	the	Union	and	the	creation	of	a	Little	England,	with	the	Labour	Party	as
a	permanent	minority	unable	to	implement	the	socialist	policies.	In	this	situation,	English	socialists	would	find
themselves	unable	to	prevent	the	Conservative	majority	of	this	‘fundamentally	Tory	country’	(37)	from	creating	a
neoliberal	‘Singapore	of	the	Atlantic’,	with	lower	taxes	and	lower	welfare	protections	than	its	neighbours	across	the
Channel	in	the	EU.
In	fact,	without	the	obstructionist,	neoliberal	influence	of	the	UK,	which	consistently	used	its	veto	within	the	EU	to
scuttle	the	creation	of	supranational	social	policy	as	well	as	broader	social	protections,	post-Brexit	the	continental
left	may	even	be	able	to	fulfil	its	dreams	of	a	social	Europe	by	adopting	a	strong	environmental	agenda,	reforming
globalisation	by	regulating	financial	capitalism,	combatting	inequality,	and	creating	progressive	standards	of	market
access	that	govern	both	the	labour	process	and	the	end	product	sold	within	the	EU.
While	Tuck	believes	that	the	EU’s	constitution	is	too	rigid	to	allow	for	such	change,	recent	events	tied	to	the
Coronavirus	pandemic	have	shown	that	the	EU	is	actually	quite	flexible	and	that	change	is	possible	when	the
leaders	of	the	member-states	come	together.	When	they	do	so,	they	are	often	able	to	come	up	with	ad	hoc,
emergency	solutions,	some	of	which	even	bypass	the	constitutional	provisions	of	the	treaties	to	achieve	their	goals.
Upon	closer	examination,	it	is	clear	that	the	EU’s	current	market-friendly	structure	is	neither	permanent	nor
necessary.	The	basic	problem	for	the	left	is	not	the	constraints	of	Europe’s	economic	constitution,	but	democratic
socialism’s	failure	to	‘Europeanize’	its	agenda.	Insofar	as	the	current	structure	of	the	EU’s	basic	treaties	favours	the
free	market,	this	result	is	the	product	of	politics,	as	the	right	took	advantage	of	their	predominance	in	the	late	1980s
and	early	90s,	when	10	out	of	12	member-states	were	led	by	conservative	prime	ministers,	to	embed	neo-liberalism
at	the	European	level.	By	contrast,	the	left	failed	to	imbed	a	supranational	social	policy	in	the	EU	in	the	late	1990s,
when	13	out	of	15	member-states	were	ruled	by	social	democrats.	This	missed	opportunity	has	come	back	to	haunt
progressives,	especially	since	the	onset	of	the	Great	Recession.
Nationalism	or	internationalism
The	left’s	basic	problem	is	that	its	thinking	has	remained	trapped	within	the	narrow	horizons	of	the	nation-state.
Tuck’s	arguments	about	the	need	to	return	to	the	sovereign	nation-state	and	his	desire	to	create	‘a	socialist	offshore
island’	(120)	are	reflective	of	the	broader	problems	of	‘methodological	nationalism’.	Like	Wolfgang	Streeck,	who
looks	back	fondly	on	the	halcyon	glory	days	of	the	social-democratic	nation-state	and	seeks	recreate	the	conditions
that	made	the	postwar	Wirtschaftswunder	(‘economic	miracle’)	possible,	Tuck	also	engages	in	‘utopian	nostalgia’
(34)	for	the	period	immediately	following	World	War	II.	In	particular,	he	looks	back	to	the	Labour	government	of
Clement	Attlee,	which	was	able	to	create	the	National	Health	System	(NHS)	in	1947	through	a	massive
expropriation	of	private	property	enabled	by	the	omnicompetence	of	Parliament.	He	uses	this	as	a	template	for
future	socialist	action,	even	though	the	fundamentally	conservative	political	makeup	of	the	UK	means	that	NHS	is
the	only	example	of	nationalisation	from	this	era	‘which	has	survived	more	or	less	intact’	(48).
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On	one	level,	Tuck	is	right	to	look	to	the	left’s	past	successes	for	guidance;	the	early	postwar	era	offers	much	to	be
nostalgic	about.	However,	the	economic	growth	of	this	period	was	driven	by	many	different	factors,	including	the
need	to	rebuild	after	two	world	wars	and	the	implementation	of	new	technologies,	that	no	longer	apply	today.
Nationalisation	and	the	nation-state	were	effective	tools	for	the	left	at	a	time	when	economic	and	political	power
were	both	concentrated	at	the	national	level.	This	is	no	longer	the	case,	as	advances	such	as	containerization	of
shipping,	have	made	the	globalisation	of	economic	forces	a	fait	accompli.	In	this	situation,	the	left’s	only	hope	is	to
develop	new,	supranational	tools	of	political	control,	so	that	politics	can	not	only	‘catch	up’	with	economics,	but	also
tame	global	market	forces	for	its	own	ends.
The	ultimate,	big	picture	question	for	the	left	posed	by	Brexit	–	and	by	this	book	–	is	whether	socialism	is	still	the
international	project	declared	by	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels	in	the	Communist	Manifesto,	or	whether	it	should
tie	its	fortunes	to	the	nation	and	the	state.	While	Tuck	provides	interesting	arguments	for	the	latter,	his	position	is
ultimately	unconvincing.	Instead	of	counterproductively	supporting	Brexit,	the	British	and	European	left	would	do
better	to	join	forces	and	push	for	change	within	the	EU.	The	left	needs	to	take	advantage	of	future	opportunities	to
create	social	policy	at	the	international	level	to	achieve	its	goals.	Given	the	state	of	the	world	today,	retrenching
back	to	the	nation-state	is	neither	realistic	nor	desirable.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Featured	image	licensed	under	the	Creative	Commons	Attribution-ShareAlike	3.0	License.
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